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NO. COA03-781
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 20 July 2004
HARRY EUGENE VAUGHN,
Employee,
Plaintiff,
v. North Carolina Industrial Commission
I.C. File No. 714937
INSULATING SERVICES,
Employer,
TRAVELERS INSURANCE,
USF&G (HARTFORD), KEMPER,
ROYAL INSURANCE, MASSACHUSETTS BAY,
AETNA LIFE & CASUALTY, and
HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Carriers,
Defendants
Appeal by plaintiff from Opinion and Award entered 27 March 2003 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 March 2004.
Wallace
and Graham, P.A., by Richard L. Huffman, for plaintiff-appellant.
Cranfill,
Sumner, & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Amanda L. Kims for defendant-appellees
Insulating Services, Inc. and USF&G (the Hartford); Hedrick, Eatman, Garner
& Kincheloe, L.L.P, by Jeffrey A. Kadis for defendant-appellees Insulating
Services, Inc. and the Kemper Group; John F. Morris and Roberta S. Sperry for
defendant-appellees Insulating Services, Inc. and Hanover Insurance Company
(Massachusetts Bay Insurance); Stiles, Byrum, & Horne, by Henry C. Byrum,
Jr., for defendant-appellees Insulating Services, Inc. and Harleysville
Insurance Company; Alala, Mullen, Holland, & Cooper, P.A., by J. Reid
McGraw, Jr. for defendant-appellees Insulating Services, Inc. and The Travelers
Insurance; and McAngus, Goudelock, & Courie, P.L.L.C., by Andrew R. Ussery
and Daniel B. Eller for defendant-appellees Insulating Services, Inc. and Royal
Insurance.
STEELMAN,
Judge.
Harry
Eugene Vaughn (“plaintiff”) appeals an opinion and award of the North Carolina
Industrial Commission (“the Commission”) denying his claim for compensation for
an alleged occupational disease. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
At
the time of the hearing before the deputy commissioner, plaintiff was
sixty-four years old. He completed his education through the eighth grade, and
he received a GED during his military service.
Plaintiff
began working in the insulation industry in1952. He continued working in the
insulation business until 1959, at which time he joined the Army. The majority
of the work plaintiff performed between 1952 and 1959 involved insulation
containing asbestos. Plaintiff left the Army in 1980 and subsequently worked
for various insulation companies.
Plaintiff
began his employment with Insulating Services, Inc. (“defendant-employer”) in
1983. He worked for defendant-employer until his retirement in February 2000.
Plaintiff spent much of his time working at a facility in Charlotte that is now
owned by B.F. Goodrich (“the Goodrich plant”). Plaintiff’s duties for
defendant-employer included installation of insulation for repair work and new
construction at the Goodrich plant and other locations. Surveys conducted at
the Goodrich plant in 1991, 1995 and 1998 indicated that there were areas
within the plant where asbestos existed.
Plaintiff
was examined on 12 April 1996 by Dr. Douglas G. Kelling, the examining
physician for the Industrial Commission’s Advisory Medical Committee. Plaintiff
provided Dr. Kelling with a written employment history, which indicated that he
worked as an insulator from 1954 until 1982, during which time he was exposed
to asbestos without benefit of a respirator.
Plaintiff
did not mention any specific exposure to asbestos during his employment with
defendant-employer. Dr. Kelling diagnosed plaintiff with asbestosis.
Plaintiff
was also examined by Dr. Patrick Kelly, a Board certified pulmonologist, on 19
November 1999. Dr. Kelly noted that “[plaintiff] reports exposure to asbestos
[during his employment with defendant-employer] although it is somewhat unclear
exactly in what form.” Plaintiff did not advise Dr. Kelly of any specific
incidents of exposure to asbestos dust while working for defendant-employer.
Dr. Kelly diagnosed plaintiff with asbestosis.
On
16 May 1997, plaintiff filed a Form 18B alleging asbestosis and seeking
workers’ compensation benefits from defendant-employer. The carriers are the
insurance companies that provided worker’s compensation insurance for employer
during the course of plaintiff’s employment. Defendants denied liability.
In
an opinion and award filed 27 March 2003, the Commission denied plaintiff’s
claim for compensation. Plaintiff gave notice of appeal to this Court on 4
April 2003.
On
appeal of an opinion and award by the Industrial Commission, this Court is
“limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission’s
findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission’s
conclusions of law.” Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116,
530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). Evidence tending to support the plaintiff’s claim
is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Adams v. AVX
Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998), reh’g denied,
350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). However, if there is any evidence in the
record to support a finding of fact by the Commission, it is conclusive on
appeal, even if there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Id.
Moreover, the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given the evidence. Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distr., 108
N.C. App. 762, 765, 425 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993).
In
his first assignment of error, plaintiff argues the Commission used the
incorrect legal standard to determine if plaintiff was injuriously exposed to
asbestos while employed by Insulating Services. We disagree.
N.C.
Gen. Stat. §97-57 (2003) states:
In
any case where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the
employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if any which was on the
risk when the employee was so last exposed under such employer, shall be
liable.
The statute goes on to explain the phrase
“last injuriously exposed” in the context of asbestosis claims:
For
the purpose of this section when an employee has been exposed to the hazards of
asbestosis or silicosis for as much as 30 working days, or parts thereof,
within seven consecutive calendar months, such exposure shall be deemed
injurious but any less exposure shall not be deemed injurious . . . .
Id. To recover under this statute, the plaintiff must show: (1)
that he has a compensable occupational disease and (2) that he was “last
injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease” in defendant-employer’s
employment. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 88, 301
S.E.2d 359, 362 (1983).
The
plaintiff contends that the Commission made four errors of law in coming to its
conclusions. First, plaintiff argues the Commission improperly required him to
produce scientific or medical evidence of exposure to asbestos for the relevant
time period while in defendant’s employ. Plaintiff is correct that there is no
need for such expert testimony. Austin v. Continental General Tire, 141
N.C. App. 397, 404, 540 S.E.2d 824, 829 (2000), rev’d on other grounds,
354 N.C. 344, 553 S.E.2d 680 (2001). In addressing the issue of producing
scientific evidence of exposure to toxic substances, this Court stated:
It
is unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended an employee to bear the
burden of making [toxicity] measurements during his employment in order to lay
the groundwork for a worker’s compensation claim. Such an interpretation of the
statute would make it virtually impossible for an employee to successfully
bring suit for compensation . . . due to the difficulty he would encounter in
attempting to make measurements of [toxic airborne substances] on his
employer’s premises. A construction of the statute which defeats its purpose .
. . would be irrational and will not be adopted by this Court.
Id., citing Gay v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 79 N.C. App.
324, 333-34, 339 S.E.2d 490, 496 (quoting McCuiston v.
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 308 N.C. 665, 668, 303 S.E.2d 795, 797
(1983)). This does not mean, however, that the Commission cannot consider
expert testimony, or the lack thereof, along with lay testimony, in weighing
the evidence and determining whether claimant has met his burden of proof.
Plaintiff
has the burden of proving his claim by the “greater weight of the evidence” or
by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Phillips v. U.S. Air, 120 N.C.
App. 538, 541, 463 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1995). Thus, the plaintiff must present
credible evidence of exposure sufficient to prove that he was last injuriously
exposed while working for the defendant-employer.
Second,
plaintiff argues that the Commission improperly determined that his asbestosis
was caused by exposure prior to his employment with defendant. With regard to
the issues of the extent of exposure, prior exposure and causation, this Court
has said that “last injurious exposure” did not have to cause or even
significantly contribute to a claimant’s disease, rather it is sufficient for
it to be “an exposure which proximately augmented the disease to any extent,
however slight.” Cain v. Guyton, 79 N.C. App. 696, 701, 340 S.E.2d 501,
505, aff’d 318 N.C. 410, 348 S.E.2d 595 (1986), quoting Rutledge,
308 N.C. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362-63. Therefore it is not necessary for
plaintiff to prove what caused his asbestosis, or where he contracted it. He
must simply prove that he has asbestosis, and that the last place of employment
where he was exposed to asbestos on at least 30 separate days within a
consecutive seven month period was with the defendant-employer. Prior exposure
may be relevant when actual exposure to asbestos in a defendant’s employ is in
question. If a plaintiff has not been exposed in prior employment, and has
asbestosis, then that could give rise to an inference that he was exposed (and
last injuriously exposed) while working for defendant-employer.
Third,
plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in refusing to rely on inferences
that can be drawn from the evidence. As stated above, the Commission is the
sole determiner of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given
to the evidence. The Commission must then make a determination considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. This does not mean,
however, that the Commission must accept as true all evidence favoring
plaintiff and make all inferences that support plaintiff’s claim. It is up to
the Commission to make the final determination in weighing the evidence.
“Indeed the Commission is required to evaluate the credibility of the evidence
and reject any evidence it finds as not convincing.” Phillips, 120 N.C.
App. at 542, 463 S.E.2d at 262. The plaintiff must present credible evidence of
exposure sufficient to prove that he was last injuriously exposed while working
for the defendant-employer.
Finally,
plaintiff argues that the Commission placed an impossible burden on him to prove
his case. As previously stated, “The degree of proof required of a party
plaintiff under the Act is the ‘greater weight’ of the evidence or
‘preponderance’ of the evidence.” Id. at 541, 463 S.E.2d at 261.
The
Commission found the plaintiff’s testimony that he was regularly exposed to
asbestos in defendant’s employ over the relevant period not to be credible, and
thus afforded it little weight. It based its finding on inconsistencies between
plaintiff’s testimony and “his behavior and reports to his doctors.” The
Commission found that even if it afforded the plaintiff’s own testimony greater
weight, this testimony was not sufficient to meet plaintiff’s burden of proof:
The
only testimony on this issue came from plaintiff when he described working at
the tank farm at the Goodrich plant in 1996. Plaintiff testified that he worked
in that area for a month and a half or two months, and that asbestos abatement
crews were later called in 1999 to work in those areas. Plaintiff believed that
he was exposed to asbestos when he worked on the tanks because the asbestos
abatement crews, with their plastic tents, were called to work there later. On
further clarification of this potential exposure, plaintiff explained that he
worked nearly 40 tanks in the tank farm for “almost a month and a half” and
that he later saw the asbestos abatement tents on two of the tanks. During this
time period plaintiff was working four days per week, and thus a month and a
half would have consisted of 24 to 28 days. Two months at four days a week
would amount to about 32 days. Even assuming that plaintiff’s testimony is
true, and that two of the tanks had asbestos as indicated by subsequent work by
an abatement crew, at the average rate of completing one to two tanks per day,
plaintiff’s testimony does not establish 30 days of exposure within a seven
consecutive month period. Furthermore, exposure to asbestos during employment
with defendant-employer cannot be assumed from plaintiff’s diagnosis of
asbestosis, because plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos before his employment with
defendant-employer was sufficient to cause the disease. The greater weight of
the credible evidence is that plaintiff was not exposed to the hazards of
asbestos for 30 or more working days during a seven consecutive month period
while working for defendant-employer.
There
is competent evidence in the record to support the Commission’s findings.
Although plaintiff was employed by defendant-employer when he was examined by
Dr. Kelling, plaintiff never mentioned any potential exposure to asbestos
during his examination. Moreover, plaintiff’s own testimony shows that he did
not know when or if he was exposed to asbestos while working for
defendant-employer. Consequently, the Commission, as the sole judge of
credibility, determined that plaintiff’s testimony that he was exposed on at
least 30 days in a consecutive seven month period in 1996 while working for
defendant-employer was entitled to little weight.
Based
on the Commission’s findings of fact, we conclude that the Commission applied
the correct standard under N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-57 in determining plaintiff did
not meet his burden of proving last injurious exposure under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§97-57.
The
Commission did not require plaintiff to submit scientific or medical testimony,
it merely noted that there was none. The Commission did not improperly require
that plaintiff prove his asbestosis was contracted while employed by
defendant-employer, it merely noted that plaintiff’s asbestosis was not proof
of exposure while in the employ of defendant-employer since he was exposed
prior to that employment. The Commission was not required to make inferences
supporting plaintiff’s position if it determined the evidence was not credible.
Finally, there is nothing in the record to support plaintiff’s contention that
he was held to an “impossible burden.” The record supports the Commission’s
conclusion that plaintiff failed to prove his claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.
In
the instant case, the Commission found that plaintiff did not meet his burden
of proof that he was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of asbestosis
during his employment with defendant-employer. There is credible evidence to
support the Commission’s findings, thus, its denial of compensation under N.C. Gen.
Stat. §97-57 must be affirmed.
Having
determined that there is competent evidence in the record to support the
Commission’s findings of fact, and that those findings of fact support it’s
conclusions of law that plaintiff was not last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of asbestosis while employed by defendant-employer, we need not reach
plaintiffs remaining assignments of error.
AFFIRMED.
Judges
McGEE and CALABRIA concur.