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NO. COA03-459
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 17 August 2004
PHYLLIS MOODY, Administratrix
of the Estate of OSCAR JENKINS
MOODY, Deceased Employee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. North Carolina Industrial Commission
I.C. File No. 466252
MECKLENBURG COUNTY,
Employer,
SELF-INSURED,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal by defendant from opinion and award entered 20 December 2002 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 February 2004.
Cox,
Gage & Sasser, by Margaret B. DeVries, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jones,
Hewson & Woolard, by Lawrence J. Goldman, for defendant-appellant.
McGEE,
Judge.
Mecklenburg
County (employer) appeals from an opinion and award of the North Carolina
Industrial Commission (the Commission) entered 20 December 2002 finding that
Oscar Jenkins Moody (Moody) suffered a compensable injury by accident while
working for employer.
The
evidence before the Commission tended to show that Moody was a deputy sheriff
employed as a trustee coordinator with the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s
Department. Moody was involved in an automobile collision on 15 August 1994 as
he was driving “downtown to headquarters.” Moody’s vehicle hydroplaned and was
hit by an oncoming truck. Moody testified that the accident resulted in
injuries to his left knee, right shoulder, back, neck, and head.
Employer paid Moody temporary total
disability compensation from the date of the accident until October 1999. A
deputy commissioner entered an opinion and award on 24 September
1999terminating temporary total disability benefits for Moody retroactive to 13
April 1996. The Commission reversed the deputy commissioner’s award and ordered
that employer pay additional workers’ compensation benefits, including (1)
payment for “reasonable and necessary medical and psychological treatment”
because of the injury by accident, (2) payment for weekly benefits from the
date of injury until death, and (3) payment for permanent injuries. Employer
appeals. We note that due to Moody’s death prior to entry of the Commission’s
opinion and award, Phyllis Moody, Administratrix of Moody’s estate (Administratrix),
was substituted for Moody.
Employer’s
first argument is two-fold: (1) that the Commission erred in failing to make
any findings regarding Moody’s credibility and/or (2) that the Commission erred
in failing to make any findings regarding Moody’s medical care providers’
reliance on Moody’s credibility in rendering their opinions.
Regarding the first prong of the
argument, employer asserts that Moody’s credibility was “clearly the key issue
in this case” and therefore, the Commission should have addressed Moody’s
credibility. We note at the outset that employer does not attack Moody’s
credibility based on the testimony he provided as a witness at the hearing.
Rather, employer attacks Moody’s credibility with respect to the conflicting
information Moody provided throughout his treatment. Employer argues that Moody
provided “misinformation to his physicians in an apparent attempt to exaggerate
the extent of his disability.” Specifically, employer notes that the emergency
room report after the accident conflicts with how Moody later described the
accident and injuries. Thus, employer asserts that the Commission should have
made a finding regarding Moody’s credibility.
It
is well settled that the Commission is “the sole judge of the weight and credibility
of the evidence[.]” Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116,
530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). In addition, “[t]he Commission is not required . .
. to find facts as to all credible evidence. That requirement would place an
unreasonable burden on the Commission. Instead, the Commission must find those
facts which are necessary to support its conclusions of law.” London v. Snak
Time Catering, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 473, 476, 525 S.E.2d 203, 205, cert.
denied, 352 N.C. 589, 544 S.E.2d 781 (2000) (citations omitted).
In
this case, the Commission made multiple findings regarding the accident and
Moody’s subsequent course of medical treatment. Employer is correct in its
assertion that the Commission did not make a specific finding of fact to
address Moody’s credibility. However, as stated above, the Commission is not
required to make findings regarding all of the evidence before it. “It is the
exclusive province of the Industrial Commission to weigh and evaluate the
evidence before it and find the facts.” Lucas v. Thomas Built Buses, 88
N.C. App. 587, 589, 364 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1988).
Here,
it appears that the Commission properly weighed the evidence before it and
found those facts which were necessary to support its conclusions. More
specifically, it is evident that the Commission examined the various statements
Moody made to the emergency room doctors because the Commission found as a fact
that Moody “gave inconsistent accounts about his possible loss of consciousness
after the 15 August 1994 accident.” This finding implies that the Commission
did evaluate the statements Moody made to his medical care providers. Although
the Commission did not make an explicit finding regarding Moody’s credibility,
such a finding was not required.
Employer
cites two cases in arguing that reversal is warranted when the Commission fails
to make “specific findings of fact as to the crucial questions necessary to
support the Industrial Commission decision[.]” We note that the cases cited by
employer, Grant v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 241, 335
S.E.2d 327 (1985) and Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 290
S.E.2d 682 (1982), for the proposition that findings of fact are required, do
not deal with the Commission’s failure to make findings regarding credibility.
In Grant, our Court found that “the factual findings in this case are
insufficient to determine the rights of the parties on the issue of
disability.” Grant, 77 N.C. App. at 249, 335 S.E.2d at 333. Similarly,
in Hilliard, our Supreme Court held that the Commission “failed to make
specific findings of fact as to the crucial questions necessary to support a
conclusion as to whether plaintiff had suffered any disability as defined by
G.S. 97-2(9).” Hilliard, 305 N.C. at 596, 290 S.E.2d at 684. Accordingly,
this argument is without merit.
Under
the second prong of employer’s first argument, employer argues that the opinion
of Dr. Patricia L. Gross (Dr. Gross) was based in large part on Moody’s
credibility. Accordingly, employer argues that the Commission “should have made
a finding on [Moody’s] credibility before accepting Dr. Gross’ testimony or
rejected that testimony entirely.” For the reasons stated below, we disagree.
As
explained above, the Commission is not required to make findings on all
credible evidence. See London, 136 N.C. App. at 476, 525 S.E.2d at 205. See
also Peagler v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 138 N.C. App. 593, 602, 532 S.E.2d 207,
213 (2000). Further, we note that
[t]his
Court in Adams made it clear that the Commission does not have to
explain its findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or
witnesses it finds credible. Requiring the Commission to explain its
credibility determinations and allowing the Court of Appeals to review the
Commission’s explanation of those credibility determinations would be
inconsistent with our legal system’s tradition of not requiring the fact finder
to explain why he or she believes one witness over another or believes one
piece of evidence is more credible than another.
Deese, 352 N.C. at 116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553.
In
finding of fact number fourteen, the Commission “accept[ed] the diagnoses and
causation analysis of Dr. Gross and reject[ed] those of Dr. Gualtieri.” Dr.
Gross is a neuropsychologist who testified in a deposition that Moody suffered
a “concussion with brief loss of consciousness that led to a mild frontal lobe
syndrome.” She testified that this injury resulted in permanent brain damage
with cognitive and personality effects. As stated above, the Commission is not
required to elaborate on why it believes one witness or piece of evidence over
another. Employer’s argument that the Commission should have made a finding
about Moody’s credibility prior to accepting Dr. Gross’ testimony is
essentially an argument that the Commission needs to justify or explain why it
found Dr. Gross credible. Under Deese, such an explanation is not
required. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Employer
next argues in multiple assignments of error that the Commission erred in
finding that Moody sustained a concussion or brain injury in the accident which
caused anxiety disorders and depression and prevented Moody’s employment. The
challenged findings of fact include the following:
3. Decedent
sustained a concussion in the accident. A concussion can occur by the shaking
of the brain without a direct impact to the head.
4. . . .
Decedent gave inconsistent accounts about his possible loss of consciousness
after the 15 August 1994 accident. Confusion is a common symptom in cases of
concussion.
. . .
18. The
accident of 15 August 1994 caused decedent to suffer a brain injury, which, in
turn, caused anxiety disorders and depression that prevented decedent from
working beginning immediately after the 15 August 1994 accident and continuing.
In
addition, employer challenges the following conclusions of law:
2. As
a result of the injury by accident of 15 August 1994, decedent developed
physical injuries, anxiety disorders, and depression. Defendant is responsible
for such reasonable and necessary medical treatment, psychological treatment,
and counseling rendered . . . .
3. Due
to the psychological conditions suffered by decedent following the 15 August
1994 injury by accident, decedent was unable [to] earn wages in any employment
from 15 August 1994 and continuing until his death.
“When
reviewing an Industrial Commission decision, our Court is ‘limited to reviewing
whether any competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings of fact and
whether the findings of fact support the Commission’s conclusions of law.’“ Smith
v. First Choice Servs., 158 N.C. App. 244, 248, 580 S.E.2d 743, 747
(quoting Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553 (2000)), disc.
review denied, 357 N.C. 461, 586 S.E.2d 99 (2003). “‘The findings of fact
by the Industrial Commission are conclusive on appeal if supported by any
competent evidence.’“ Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d
411, 414 (1998) (quoting Gallimore v. Marilyn’s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399,
402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977)).
Findings
of fact numbers three and four which state that Moody suffered a concussion are
supported by Dr. Gross’ deposition testimony. Dr. Gross stated that Moody
suffered “a concussion with brief loss of consciousness[.]” In addition, Dr.
Gross recorded Moody’s diagnosis in her neuropsychological evaluation as
“[c]oncussion with brief loss of consciousness (less than 1 hour).” Further, in
this case, employer’s Form 19 states that as a result of a motor vehicle
accident, Moody “suffered concussion, [left] knee injury, [right] back bruise
and other multiple injuries.”
Finding
number eighteen is also supported by Dr. Gross’ testimony. She stated in her
deposition testimony that as a result of the 15 August 1994 accident, Moody
suffered “a mild brain injury with post-concussive syndrome.” She further
stated that this injury would affect Moody permanently. In addition, Dr. Gross
stated that according to a report of Moody’s wife, after the accident, Moody
“was more reclusive, refused to do things that he used to do socially, whereas
he used to be very outgoing, family oriented.” She further testified that the
brain injury exacerbated Moody’s personality disorder and caused behavioral and
emotional effects. As a result, Dr. Gross testified that Moody’s brain injury
would “[a]bsolutely” prevent his return to work as a deputy. Similarly, Dr.
Edward C. Holscher testified in his deposition that “probably 80 to 90 percent”
of Moody’s inability to work because of psychiatric problems was due to the 15
August 1994 accident.
Lastly,
both of the disputed conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact.
Specifically, finding number eighteen supports these conclusions of law.
Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Affirmed.
Judges
WYNN and TYSON concur.