All opinions
are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official
publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals
Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an
opinion and the print version appearing in the North Carolina Reports and North
Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, the latest print version is to be considered
authoritative.
NO. COA06-276
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 March 2007
BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL,
Employee,
Plaintiff
v. North
Carolina Industrial Commission
I.C. File No. 224099
ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Employer
SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.),
Third-Party
Administrator,
Defendants
Appeal by plaintiff from an opinion and award entered 5
October 2005 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 December
2006.
Ralph
T. Bryant, Jr., P.A., by Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
Attorney
General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Gary A. Scarzafava,
for defendant-appellee Onslow County Board of Education.
HUNTER, Judge.
Barbara Katrina Hassell (“plaintiff”) appeals from an
opinion and award of the Industrial Commission (“the Commission”) denying her
claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
The Commission determined that plaintiff’s generalized anxiety disorder
was not due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her
employment as a sixth-grade teacher with the Onslow County Board of Education
(“defendant”). Plaintiff argues the
Commission erred in certain findings of fact and erred in concluding she had
failed to prove her position placed her at an increased risk of developing an
occupational disease. After careful
review, we affirm the opinion and award of the Commission.
On 8 June 2005, plaintiff’s case came before the Commission,
which found facts tending to establish the following: Plaintiff, who was fifty-six years old, worked as a school
teacher for defendant from 1987 until February 2002. Plaintiff was an elementary school teacher until approximately
1996, when she became a sixth-grade teacher at Dixon Middle School in Onslow
County, North Carolina. While working
at Dixon Middle School, plaintiff had problems maintaining order in her
classroom on a continual basis. During
2001, plaintiff experienced some type of disciplinary incident every week. Plaintiff dreaded going to work because of
these disciplinary problems. Because of
plaintiff’s lack of classroom management, her students were disrespectful and
verbally and physically harassed and intimidated her. For example, students called her “grease monkey,” and used curse
words towards her. Students regularly
walked out of plaintiff’s classroom without permission and wrote rude remarks
about plaintiff in their books.
Additionally, students threw spitballs and wads of paper at
plaintiff. On one occasion during an
assembly, plaintiff was hit in the back of her head by an object thrown by a
student. As a result of that incident, plaintiff
began sitting at the top bleachers of the gym with her back to the wall during
assemblies.
Plaintiff referred an unusually large number of students to
the principal’s office and received comments from the administration regarding
the volume of her referrals. Students
and parents complained to the school administration about plaintiff’s
performance as a teacher. During her
employment, plaintiff received negative performance reviews, resulting in four
“Action Plans” intended to improve plaintiff’s job performance. An Action Plan is required by law if, at any
point during or at the end of the school year, a teacher ranks below standard
in any of the major functions. On 25
January 2002, plaintiff entered into her fourth Action Plan with defendant. The
Action Plan required plaintiff in February, March, and April 2002 to show
progress toward overcoming her deficiencies and present information to show
that she was attempting to comply with the Action Plan. The Action Plan had an anticipated
completion date of 28 May 2002. The
Action Plan addressed plaintiff’s problems with her failure to follow a
classroom management plan, random efforts in discipline, negative learning
climate in her classroom, errors in grading practices, ineffective
instructional presentation, lack of feedback to students, and numerous student
and parent complaints.
Pursuant to the 25 January 2002 Action Plan, plaintiff’s
progress was scheduled for review at the end of February 2002, at which time
plaintiff was to provide the school with evidence of her efforts to comply with
the Action Plan. At a 25 February 2002
observation of her classroom by a curriculum specialist, plaintiff failed to
show progress or improvement in the quality of her classroom instruction. The curriculum specialist noted that
plaintiff was experiencing the same classroom problems listed in the 25 January
2002 Action Plan. Plaintiff’s first
deadline for submission of information to show that she was complying with the
current Action Plan was 28 February 2002. Plaintiff did not submit any information to the school. Plaintiff was given a reminder that she was
scheduled to meet with Lesley Eason (“Eason”), Dixon Middle School principal,
at 3:15 p.m. on 28 February 2002.
Rather than attend this meeting, plaintiff asked Eason for a four-day
extension of the deadline. On 1 March
2002, Eason met with plaintiff and advised her that she had not documented
sufficient progress and that the curriculum specialist would observe her
classroom again on 4 March 2002, before discussing her observations with
plaintiff. Eason told plaintiff to continue to work to demonstrate improved
classroom instruction and that she would share the results of their meeting
with the personnel department. However,
plaintiff refused to sign a warning letter, left the school, and never returned
there. On 19 April 2002, plaintiff
officially resigned her position with defendant, effective 3 June 2002.
Plaintiff testified that she was unable to continue working
at the school because of the feeling that she could no longer handle the work
environment due to her stress and anxiety.
Eason testified that plaintiff herself created the chaotic classroom
environment and that plaintiff’s lack of instructional presentation and
delivery in her classroom led to many of her classroom problems. Other teachers with the same students as
plaintiff did not have similar problems.
Eason stated that “‘in sixteen years I had never seen a situation as bad
as the situation in [plaintiff’s] classroom.’”
On 2 March 2002, plaintiff was examined by Dennis Chestnut,
a psychologist. Dr. Chestnut found
plaintiff was experiencing a severe emotional crisis and he considered
hospitalizing plaintiff. At his initial interview with plaintiff, the two major
areas of concern identified were family relations and occupational issues. Dr.
Chestnut diagnosed plaintiff with Generalized Anxiety Disorder. As of 6 March
2002, Dr. Chestnut medically excused plaintiff from work and stated that she
was unable to return to the teaching profession. Dr. Chestnut stated that plaintiff’s “‘job was driving her crazy’”
and that plaintiff’s total job experience was a major stressor in her life.
The Commission found that “[a]lthough plaintiff developed an
anxiety disorder, her psychological condition was not the result of anything
caused by defendant or because she was required to do anything unusual as a
teacher.” Rather, “[p]laintiff was in a
stressful classroom environment that was caused by her inadequate job performance
and inability to perform her job duties as a teaching professional.” Based on its findings, the Commission
concluded that “plaintiff’s stress and
anxiety disorder developed from her inability to perform her job in accordance
with defendant’s requirements” and that she had failed to show that she
sustained an occupational disease “due to causes and conditions which are
characteristic of and peculiar to her employment.” The Commission entered an opinion and award denying plaintiff
workers’ compensation benefits.
Plaintiff appeals.[Note 1]
Plaintiff argues she sustained an occupational disease
arising from her employment. An
occupational disease is one “which is proven to be due to causes and conditions
which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or
employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is equally exposed outside of the employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-53(13) (2005). “The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence of an
occupational disease.” Norris v.
Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 620, 621, 534
S.E.2d 259, 261 (2000).
While mental illness qualifies as a compensable occupational
disease under appropriate circumstances, see Smith-Price v. Charter
Pines Behavioral Ctr., 160 N.C. App. 161, 171, 584 S.E.2d 881, 887-88
(2003), the claimant must first establish that “the mental illness or injury
was due to stresses or conditions different from those borne by the general
public.” Pitillo v. N.C. Dep’t of
Envtl. Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 648, 566 S.E.2d 807,
813 (2002). We therefore consider
whether the Commission erred in determining that plaintiff failed to prove she
sustained an occupational disease due to conditions and stress unique to her
employment as a teacher.
By her first assignment of error, plaintiff argues the
evidence was insufficient to support the Commission’s Findings of Fact Nos. 6,
8, 11, 12, 13, and 14. Plaintiff
contends the greater weight of the evidence supports alternate findings
favorable to plaintiff, and that the Commission erred in failing to find such
alternate findings. Plaintiff contends
the flawed findings made by the Commission do not support its conclusion that
plaintiff failed to prove she suffered from an occupational disease.
The standard of review upon appeal of an Industrial
Commission case is well settled:
“Appellate review of an opinion and award of the Commission is limited
to a determination of (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by
competent evidence, and (2) whether the conclusions of law are supported by the
findings.” Lewis v. Duke Univ.,
163 N.C. App. 408, 412, 594 S.E.2d 100, 103 (2004); Smith-Price, 160
N.C. App. at 165, 584 S.E.2d at 884.
This Court is bound by the Commission’s findings where they are
supported by any substantial evidence even where there is evidence that would
have supported a finding to the contrary.
Id.
Plaintiff argues the Commission erred when it found in
Finding of Fact No. 6 that “[p]laintiff refused to sign a warning letter, left
school and never returned to school” and by finding in Finding of Fact No. 8
that:
Plaintiff
acknowledged that her stress was caused by her inability to perform her job in
accordance with the requirements set by defendant, as well as her inability to
achieve the requirements of the Action Plan and observational analysis. Plaintiff admitted that she did not have
control of her classes, that her lesson plans and the subjects to be taught
were not completed, that she had complaints from parents and students that
grades were inaccurate, that she had not properly averaged students’ grades,
and that she had not completed the items listed on the January 25, 2002 Action
Plan before she quit working for the school.
Plaintiff
argues the Commission erred by finding these issues were unresolved at the time
of plaintiff’s last day of employment, and that the Commission should have
found that all of the issues had been resolved except for students’ behavioral
problems in the classroom.
Plaintiff testified she had “a problem . . . maintaining order in [her] classroom” and “did not have control of [her] classes[,]” although other teachers at the school teaching the same children did not experience the behavioral problems plaintiff encountered. She also acknowledged there had been “complaints at various times since 1999 from students and parents that their grades were not accurate[,]” and that she failed to properly average the grades. The school took several measures to assist plaintiff with the situation, including implementation of an Action Plan on 25 January 2002 to focus on correcting problems in plaintiff’s teaching and to help her better manage her classroom. Plaintiff met with the school principal, Eason, on 25 February 2002 to discuss the Action Plan. Plaintiff acknowledged that Eason was not satisfied with plaintiff’s progress in implementing the Action Plan. Plaintiff and Eason met again on 2 March 2002. Eason asked plaintiff to “review and sign papers indicating that [plaintiff was] not progressing along the Action Plan[.]” Plaintiff refused to sign the papers and did not return to her employment after that day. She felt she “could not do [the] action plans, and . . . could not do everything else with the behavior and just life in general.” Plaintiff agreed that her “stress [was] caused by [her] inability to perform in accordance with the requirements of what the school [was] demanding and [her] inability to achieve the requirements of the action plans and the observation analysis[.]” In light of this testimony, we conclude there is substantial evidence of record to support the Commission’s findings, and we overrule this assignment of error.
Plaintiff contends the Commission erred by finding in
Finding of Fact No. 11 that “Dr. Chestnut explained that plaintiff’s anxiety
focused on her difficulty with the principal.”
Plaintiff argues the Commission should have found that the behavior of
the children in her classroom caused her the greatest anxiety. However, plaintiff’s treating psychologist,
Dr. Dennis Chestnut, testified that plaintiff
had gotten a
new administrator, and she felt that the new administrator was not supportive
of her; did – the new administrator did not feel that she was doing a good job,
and that regardless of how hard she worked or regardless of what she did, that
the administrator was going to find something wrong with it. . . . [S]he felt that not only [did] the
administrator fe[el] that she was not doing a good job . . . she felt that the
administrator was not supportive when she made decisions in reference to
students.
. . .
And so that was a -- what I call a second element, the --
first the administrative feeling, you know, of what you’re doing on the job,
whether that’s the right thing; then the lack of support.
Dr.
Chestnut further noted that plaintiff “was constantly in fear of not doing
something, not pleasing somebody; you know, that fear was there, and, you know,
and it’s documented that, you know, this is not satisfactory, this is not
satisfactory.”
Although Dr. Chestnut testified that the students’
misbehavior also caused plaintiff great apprehension, this Court “does not have
the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its
weight. The court’s duty goes no
further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to
support the finding.” Anderson v.
Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965). As the Commission’s finding was supported by
competent evidence of record, we must overrule this assignment of error.
By further assignment of error, plaintiff contends the
Commission failed to give proper weight to the testimony by Dr. Chestnut. It is well established, however, that the
Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
to be given their testimony. Matthews
v. City of Raleigh, 160 N.C. App. 597, 600, 586 S.E.2d 829, 833
(2003). The Commission
does not have
to explain its findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or
witnesses it finds credible. Requiring
the Commission to explain its credibility determinations and allowing the Court
of Appeals to review the Commission’s explanation of those credibility
determinations would be inconsistent with our legal system’s tradition of not
requiring the fact finder to explain why he or she believes one witness over
another or believes one piece of evidence is more credible than another.
Deese
v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116-17, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553
(2000).
Although Dr. Chestnut testified that plaintiff’s employment placed her at greater risk of developing generalized anxiety, he did not identify specific factors unique to plaintiff’s job that led to the development of her anxiety. There was no evidence that Dr. Chestnut reviewed plaintiff’s employment records or otherwise investigated the validity of her complaints regarding the school. Dr. Chestnut explained that such investigation would contradict his primary role with plaintiff as her psychologist, which was to be supportive. The Commission therefore had grounds to discount Dr. Chestnut’s opinion with regard to causation and plaintiff’s increased risk of developing anxiety as opposed to the public at large, and did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Chestnut’s opinion on these issues.
Plaintiff argues there was no competent evidence to support
the Commission’s finding that “Dr. Chestnut did not indicate, however, that
another person in the same work environment or experience would develop
Generalized Anxiety Disorder.” Again,
we must disagree with plaintiff.
In support of her position, plaintiff notes Dr. Chestnut was
asked whether “another person . . . in the same school with the same students
and the same principal and the same administration would result in having a
psychological diagnosis[.]” He
responded that “[t]hey could or they may not.”
This testimony does not support plaintiff’s argument, however. A general question regarding whether or not
another person working under similar conditions as plaintiff would “result in
having a psychological diagnosis” is not the same as a specific question
whether someone would develop Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Indeed, it is not at all clear what is meant
by a “psychological diagnosis.” Moreover,
Dr. Chestnut indicated only that a person working under similar circumstances
“could” have such a “psychological diagnosis.”
Plaintiff also points to the following statement by Dr.
Chestnut: “But I could say that if you
took a person where they were constantly . . . being thrown at, that they were
having materials hidden from them, they were having disparaging remarks, it is
likely that they, too, would show signs of anxiety, if you take those
factors.” Again, however, we do not
conclude that such vague statements by Dr. Chestnut indicating the possibility
of some sort of anxiety on the part of a person working in plaintiff’s position
equates to a definite opinion that a person working under similar circumstances
would develop Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
We find no evidence of record that Dr. Chestnut testified another person
in the same work environment or experience as plaintiff would develop
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, and we overrule this assignment of error.
Plaintiff contends there was no competent evidence to
support Findings of Fact Nos. 13 and 14.
The Commission found that:
13. Although plaintiff
developed an anxiety disorder, her psychological condition was not the result
of anything caused by defendant or because she was required to do anything
unusual as a teacher. Plaintiff was in
a stressful classroom environment that was caused by her inadequate job
performance and inability to perform her job duties as a teaching
professional. Considering all the
evidence presented, the Commission finds that there was nothing unusual about
plaintiff’s job with defendant or what was expected of her as compared to any
person similarly situated. The work plaintiff was asked to perform by defendant
was the same kind of work any teacher is required to do. Plaintiff was merely asked to perform her
job in the manner it should have been performed. Plaintiff was responsible for the bad environment in her
classroom.
14. The stress caused by plaintiff’s conflicts with students and parents and her concerns about being disciplined and losing her job were not shown to have been characteristic of the teaching profession as opposed to occupations in general. Plaintiff’s employment as a teacher did not place her at an increased risk of developing anxiety disorder as compared to the general public not so employed. Therefore, plaintiff has not proven by the greater weight of the evidence that her anxiety disorder is a compensable occupational disease under the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Plaintiff
argues the Commission should have found alternate findings favorable to her,
and that “[t]he only competent evidence proves that the plaintiff’s job was
unusual.” We do not agree.
There is substantial evidence of record to show that,
although the environment in plaintiff’s
classroom was certainly stressful, such
stress was not created by defendant, nor was it characteristic of plaintiff’s particular employment. Rather, the evidence showed that the
stressful classroom environment was caused by plaintiff’s inability to
effectively manage her classroom. Other
teachers at plaintiff’s school who taught the same students did not experience
the disciplinary problems encountered by plaintiff. Defendant did not require plaintiff to do anything other than
perform her job duties as a teaching professional. Such duties included maintaining control of the classroom
learning environment, a task plaintiff unfortunately was unable to
perform. Defendant attempted to
intervene and assist plaintiff in her endeavors to better manage her classroom,
but such attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s findings that plaintiff was responsible for the stressful work
environment, and that such stress was not characteristic of the teaching profession. We overrule this assignment of error.
Plaintiff argues the Commission erred as a matter of law
when it concluded that she had failed to prove that her position placed her at
an increased risk of developing an anxiety disorder, and by denying her claim
for benefits. Plaintiff contends she
was subjected to an abusive and dangerous work environment, and that her
anxiety disorder was an occupational disease arising from such
environment. Plaintiff argues the
Commission erred in concluding otherwise.
We do not agree.
As noted supra, plaintiff has the burden of showing
that her anxiety disorder arose due to stresses and conditions unique to her
employment. Pitillo, 151 N.C.
App. at 648, 566 S.E.2d at 813. Here,
the Commission found, and there was substantial evidence to show, that under the circumstances
presented in this case, plaintiff’s anxiety disorder did not develop from
“causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation or employment[.]”
N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-53(13).
Plaintiff’s employment as a sixth-grade teacher did not expose her to
unusual and stressful conditions, nor did defendant require her to perform any
extraordinary tasks. While we
acknowledge the challenges and stress teachers encounter every day in their
classrooms, we cannot conclude under the facts of this case that plaintiff
faced challenges and situations unlike those confronting the general public,
including other teachers. Compare
Smith-Price, 160 N.C. App. at 171, 584 S.E.2d at 888 (affirming the
Commission’s finding that the claimant’s job exposed her to unique stress not
experienced by the general public where the claimant was a nurse working with
severely mentally ill and often suicidal patients, including minor patients,
and where treatment errors could and had resulted in a minor patient’s death,
whose death the claimant took very personally). Plaintiff asserts she was “subjected” to a dangerous and volatile
work environment, but the evidence tends to establish that plaintiff herself
created the stressful work environment through her inability to perform the
ordinary tasks expected of her and every other teacher. Because plaintiff failed to show that her
employment placed her at an increased risk of developing an occupational
disease, the Commission properly denied workers’ compensation benefits. We overrule this assignment of error.
In conclusion, we affirm the award and opinion of the
Commission.
Affirmed.
Judge STEELMAN concurs.
Judge WYNN dissents in a separate opinion.
NOTE
1. We must note that plaintiff’s brief
fails to comply with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure by (1)
failing to include a “statement of the grounds for appellate review[,]” N.C.R.
App. P. 28(b)(4); and (2) failing to include a “concise statement of the
applicable standard(s) of review for each question presented[.]” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). However, we conclude that plaintiff’s rule
violations, while serious, are not so egregious as to warrant dismissal of the
appeal. Coley v. State, 173 N.C.
App. 481, 483, 620 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2005).
Reaching the merits of this case does not create an appeal for an
appellant or cause this Court to examine issues not raised by the
appellant. Id. Defendant was given sufficient notice of the
issues on appeal as evidenced by the filing of its brief thoroughly responding
to plaintiff’s arguments. As a result, we elect to review the merits of
plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 2. See Seay v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, 637
S.E.2d 299 (2006) (electing to entertain appeal despite the appellant’s
violations of Rule 28).
NO. COA06-276
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 6 March 2007
BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL,
Employee,
Plaintiff
v. North
Carolina Industrial Commission
I.C. File No. 224099
ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Employer
SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.),
Third-Party
Administrator,
Defendants
WYNN, Judge, dissenting.
The issue on appeal is whether a 56-year-old teacher’s “generalized anxiety disorder” qualifies as an occupational disease that entitles her to workers’ compensation under the North Carolina Workers Compensation Act. The teacher, Barbara Hassell, contends the Industrial Commission erred by finding that her employment at Dixon Middle School did not place her at an increased risk of developing an anxiety disorder. I agree with Ms. Hassell and therefore dissent from the majority’s decision to the contrary.
As the majority observes, mental illness qualifies as a
compensable occupational disease, see Smith Price v. Charter Pines
Behavioral Ctr., 160 N.C. App. 161, 171, 584 S.E.2d 881, 887-88 (2003) and
Ms. Hassell suffered from generalized anxiety disorder. Thus, the question is whether Ms. Hassell’s
condition was “due to stresses or conditions different from those borne by the
general public” Pitillio v. N.C.
Dep’t of Envt’l Health & Natural Res., 151 N.C. App. 641, 648, 566
S.E.2d 807, 814 (2002).
In determining that Ms. Hassell failed to make this showing,
the Commission found that her anxiety centered around her principal, rather
than her students, and that the defect in this work environment was caused by
Ms. Hassell’s own failings, rather than problems within the environment. However, the evidence does not support this
finding. Rather the evidence, as relied
upon by the Commission, included Dr. Chestnut’s opinion that Ms. Hassell’s
anxiety was caused by “the nature of her employment” which would include
her principal’s lack of support.
Significantly, Dr. Chestnut pointed to the totality of the pressures
placed on her as the primary cause of her anxiety disorder. Indeed, the language cited by the Commission
expressly noted that “she felt that the administrator was not supportive when
she made decisions in reference to students.” (Emphasis added). As Dr.
Chestnut indicated, Ms. Hassell’s day-to-day interaction with a student body
that regularly disrespected, threatened, and assaulted her was the primary
cause of her anxiety.
The Commission’s also found that Ms. Hassell’s condition
“was not the result of anything caused by the defendant or because she was
required to do anything unusual as a teacher [but was] caused by her inadequate
job performance and inability to perform her duties as a teaching
professional.” However, the test of
whether Ms. Hassell can show that her illness was due to stresses or conditions
different from those borne by the general public is met “if, as a matter of
fact, the employment exposed the worker to a greater risk of contracting the
disease than the public generally. Lewis
v. Duke Univ., 163 N.C. App. 408, 594 S.E.2d 100 (2004) (citation omitted)
(The greater risk in such cases provides the nexus between the disease and the
employment which makes them an appropriate subject for workman’s
compensation). This test is not a
matter of apportioning blame between the teacher and the administration. Rather, the issue is whether unique
workplace factors existed that put Ms. Hassell at greater risk for
illness. Factually, the Committee heard
no competent evidence that the general public faces stress or conditions on par
with what Ms. Hassell saw on a daily basis – personal taunts, racially-charged
invectives, workspace vandalism, and physical threats.
The Commission indicated that other teachers with some of
the same students did not have the same problems as Ms. Hassell. However, no other teachers confronted a
classroom like Ms. Hassell’s. The only
competent evidence about Ms. Hassell’s classroom indicated that it was uniquely
hazardous. In fact, testimony from a
substitute teacher confirmed what Ms. Hassell, her co-workers, and her
principal all expressly stated: Ms.
Hassell went to work in conditions that members of the average teaching public
do not experience.
In sum, neither the Commissions’s findings that Ms. Hassell’s problems centered around her principal, nor that her problems were caused by her own “inadequate” job performance are supported by competent evidence.