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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 183A06
FILED: 28 JUNE
2007
MULTIPLE
CLAIMANTS
v.
NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FACILITY
SERVICES, JAILS AND DETENTION SERVICES
Appeal pursuant
to N.C.G.S. §7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of
Appeals, 176 N.C. App. 278, 626 S.E.2d 666 (2006), affirming an order entered
by the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 19 March 2004. Heard in the Supreme Court 21 November 2006.
Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis
& Miles, P.C., by Benjamin E. Baker, Jr., for plaintiff-appellees.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Amar
Majmundar, Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON,
Justice.
At the heart of
this case is a fire at the Mitchell County jail that resulted in injury and
loss of life. The question before us
concerns the application of the public duty doctrine to the statutorily-imposed
duty of the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS” or “defendant”) to
inspect local confinement facilities.
Because we conclude that the special relationship exception to the
public duty doctrine applies, we hold that plaintiffs may pursue their
negligence claims against DHHS.
A fire at the
Mitchell County jail on 3 May 2002 claimed the lives of Jason Jack Boston, Mark
Halen Thomas, Jesse Allen Davis, and Danny Mark Johnson and seriously injured
O.M. Ledford, Jr. Plaintiffs in the
instant case are Mr. Ledford and the administrators of the decedents’ estates.
Plaintiffs
filed individual claims under the Tort Claims Act, Article 31 of N.C.G.S.
Chapter 143, and on 27 August 2003, the Industrial Commission (“the
Commission”) consolidated the claims with the agreement of all parties. On 21 July 2003, before all claims were
consolidated, Deputy Commissioner Edward Garner, Jr. denied defendant’s Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that the
public duty doctrine did not apply.[Note 1] On appeal, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Deputy
Commissioner. The Court of Appeals
heard the interlocutory appeal after deciding a substantial right was involved
and held, in a divided opinion, that the Commission properly denied defendant’s
motion to dismiss because the public duty doctrine did not apply and,
alternatively, the special relationship exception to the doctrine applied.
Because we are
reviewing the Commission’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, we must treat the factual allegations in plaintiffs’
affidavits of claim as true. Hunt v.
N.C. Dep’t of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 194, 499 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1998) (citing Cage
v. Colonial Bldg. Co. of Raleigh, 337 N.C. 682, 683, 448 S.E.2d 115,
116 (1994)). Plaintiffs allege that
DHHS and Ernest Dixon, a DHHS employee, were responsible for inspecting the
Mitchell County jail facility “to ensure compliance with certain regulations
and to ensure that all fire safety devices and procedures were in good working
order.” Plaintiffs allege that
defendant and Dixon “were negligent and/or wanton in their duties” and that Mr.
Ledford’s injuries and the deaths of decedents were “a direct proximate result
of said conduct.” Further, plaintiffs
allege that “[t]he State also failed to properly train [Dixon] to perform the
special duties of inspecting county jails.”
At about the
same time that defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the public duty
doctrine, plaintiffs amended their affidavits of claim to also allege that a
special relationship existed between defendant and the injured and deceased
inmates and that defendant had a special duty to them. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that because
the injured and deceased inmates were confined and unable to protect
themselves, “a special relationship arose between the aforementioned department
and individual to fulfill the duties imposed under the law to ensure that the decedent,
as a confined individual, would be protected in the event of a fire.” Plaintiffs also allege that “the State
promised it would inspect county jails to ensure the protection of inmates in
the event of fires.” Finally,
plaintiffs contend that “[t]he duties described hereinabove were not for the
benefit of the public at large, but for the benefit of the specific individuals
confined in the subject jail.”
The issue
before us is whether the public duty doctrine bars plaintiffs’ negligence
claims against DHHS. Because plaintiffs
allege facts sufficient to support the determination that a special
relationship exists between the inmates and DHHS, we hold that the special
relationship exception applies, and plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by the
public duty doctrine.
The public duty
doctrine, which this Court first adopted in Braswell v. Braswell, 330
N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991), provides that “a municipality and its agents
act for the benefit of the public, and therefore, there is no liability for the
failure to furnish police protection to specific individuals.” Id. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901. There are two exceptions to the
doctrine: “(1) where there is a special
relationship between the injured party and the police,” and “(2) ‘when a municipality,
through its police officers, creates a special duty by promising protection to
an individual, the protection is not forthcoming, and the individual’s reliance
on the promise of protection is causally related to the injury suffered.’” Id. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902
(quoting Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 194, 366 S.E.2d 2, 6, disc.
rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 275 (1988), overruled in part on
other grounds by Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 489 S.E.2d 880 (1997)). The purpose of the doctrine, as noted in Braswell,
is to respect the limited resources of law enforcement agencies by relieving
them of liability for failure to prevent every criminal act. Id. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
In Stone v.
North Carolina Department of Labor, this Court expanded the application of
the public duty doctrine to a state agency conducting a governmental function
other than law enforcement. 347 N.C.
473, 480-81, 495 S.E.2d 711, 715-16, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1016
(1998). There, the Court noted, “Just
as we recognized the limited resources of law enforcement in Braswell,
we recognize the limited resources of [the state agency] here.” Id. at 481, 495 S.E.2d at 716.
The claims in Stone
arose out of a deadly fire at the Imperial Foods Products chicken plant in Hamlet,
North Carolina. 347 N.C. at 477, 495
S.E.2d at 713. After the fire, it was
determined that conditions in the plant violated numerous provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of North Carolina. Id. For example,
building exits were blocked and the fire suppression system was
inadequate. Id. Injured employees and the personal
representatives of deceased employees filed suit against the North Carolina
Department of Labor for failure to inspect the plant. Id. The Court
concluded that the legislature’s establishment of the Occupational Safety and
Health Division of the Department of Labor did not impose “a duty upon this
agency to each individual worker in North Carolina,” but rather imposed
a duty to protect the safety of the general public. 347 N.C. at 482-83, 495 S.E.2d at 716-17. The Court noted that Chapter 95 of the North
Carolina General Statutes does not “authorize a private, individual right of
action against the State. . . . Rather,
the most the legislature intended was that the Division prescribe safety
standards and secure some reasonable compliance through spot-check inspections
made ‘as often as practicable.’” Id.
at 482, 495 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting N.C.G.S. §95-4(5) (1996)). Because the plaintiffs did not allege facts
establishing the existence of a special relationship or a special duty, those
claims failed. Id. at 483, 495
S.E.2d at 717. The holding in Stone
was confined to “this limited new context, not heretofore confronted by this
Court.” Id.
In Hunt,
this Court relied on Stone to hold that the public duty doctrine barred
claims based on the Department of Labor’s negligent inspection of
go-karts. 348 N.C. at 199, 499 S.E.2d
at 751. The plaintiff in Hunt
was operating a go-kart “when the brakes failed, causing [him] to hit a
pole.” Id. at 194, 499 S.E.2d at
748. The plaintiff suffered severe
injuries to his abdominal area from the tightening of his lap belt. Id. at 194-95, 499 S.E.2d at
748. According to a rule promulgated by
the Department of Labor, go-kart seat belts must include shoulder straps. 13 NCAC 15 .0429(a)(3)(B) (June 2006). The plaintiff alleged that “an elevator and
amusement ride inspector for defendant North Carolina Department of Labor[] had
previously inspected and passed the go-karts [in question] when the seat belts
were not in compliance with the . . . Administrative Code.” 348 N.C. at 195, 499 S.E.2d at 748. Plaintiff, by and through his guardian ad
litem, contended that the Department’s negligent inspection caused the
plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 195,
499 S.E.2d at 748-49. The Court
concluded that the Amusement Device Safety Act, N.C.G.S. §§95-111.1 to -111.18,
did not “impose a duty upon defendant to each go-kart customer.” Id. at 197, 499 S.E.2d at 750.
The Court also
considered whether the special relationship exception to the public duty
doctrine applied to the facts of Hunt.
While the Court in Hunt ultimately concluded that the special
relationship exception did not apply, its analysis of the exception is
instructive:
To determine whether
the “special relationship” exception applies, we compare the regulatory
language at issue in this case with the language at issue in Stone. In Stone we held that the applicable
statute [requiring the Department of Labor to inspect factories] “imposes a
duty upon defendants, [but] that duty is for the benefit of the public”. . .
. We conclude that the language of the
Administrative Code at issue in this case is analogous to that in Stone.
Id. at 198, 499 S.E.2d at 750 (citations
omitted) (quoting Stone, 347 N.C. at 483, 495 S.E.2d at 717 (alternation
in original)). After reviewing both the
rules governing the inspection of go-karts and the rules setting standards for
go-kart design and safety features, the Court noted that the rules did not
“explicitly prescribe a standard of conduct for this defendant as to individual
go-kart customers.” Id. at 198,
499 S.E.2d at 750-51. Thus, Hunt
instructs us to assess whether the language of the relevant statutes and
regulations clearly mandates a standard of conduct owed by an agency to the
complainant.
This Court has
not previously decided a case in which the special relationship exception to
the doctrine applies. As an initial
matter, we note that N.C.G.S. §153A-216 describes, in part, the relevant
legislative policy: “Local confinement facilities should provide secure custody
of persons confined therein in order to protect the community and should be
operated so as to protect the health and welfare of prisoners and to provide
for their humane treatment.” N.C.G.S.
§153A-216(1) (2005). Because the
operation of safe jails benefits the general public, the public duty doctrine
would generally preclude claims asserted by persons in custody absent an
exception. Here, plaintiffs argue the
special relationship exception applies.
As noted above, the exception exists “where there is a special
relationship between the injured party and the governmental entity.” Id. at 197, 499 S.E.2d at 750. While this Court has cited the special
relationship created in the context of “a state’s witness or informant who has
aided law enforcement officers” as an example of when the exception might
apply, Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902, the Court has also
recognized that the exception may apply in the context of a duty established by
statute for the benefit of particular individuals. See Myers v. McGrady, 360 N.C. 460, 469, 628 S.E.2d 761,
767 (2006); Hunt, 348 N.C. at 197-99, 499 S.E.2d at 750-51; see also
57 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability §85,
at 116-17 (2001) (noting that the special relationship exception applies in
cases “concerning a violation of a duty commanded by a statute enacted for the
special benefit of particular individuals”).
Specifically, this Court recognized in Myers that “statutes which
create a special duty or specific obligation to a particular class of
individuals” might merit different treatment than statutes that protect the
general public. 360 N.C. at 469, 628
S.E.2d at 767.
The regulatory
language at issue in the instant case is distinguishable from that at issue in Hunt
and Stone. Here, the relevant
statutes and regulations establish that defendant’s duty to inspect is to a
particular class of individuals. The
General Assembly has mandated that the Department of Health and Human Services:
Visit and inspect local confinement facilities;
advise the sheriff, jailer, governing board, and other appropriate officials as
to deficiencies and recommend improvements; and submit written reports on the
inspections to appropriate local officials.
N.C.G.S. §153A-220(3) (2005). The specific inspections required by statute
are as follows:
Department
personnel shall visit and inspect each local confinement facility at least
semiannually. The purpose of the
inspections is to investigate the conditions of confinement, the treatment
of prisoners, the maintenance of entry level employment standards for
jailers and supervisory and administrative personnel of local confinement
facilities as provided for in G.S. 153A-216(4), and to determine whether the
facilities meet the minimum standards published pursuant to G.S. 153A-221. The inspector shall make a written report of
each inspection and submit it within 30 days after the day the inspection is
completed to the governing body and other local officials responsible for the
facility. The report shall specify each
way in which the facility does not meet the minimum standards.
Id. §153A-222 (2005) (emphasis added).
Importantly,
the minimum standards that are the subject of the mandated inspections “shall
be developed with a view to providing secure custody of prisoners and to
protecting their health and welfare and providing for their humane treatment.” Id. §153A-221(a) (2005) (emphasis
added). The regulations detailing the
minimum standards for local confinement facilities also focus on the safety,
health, and welfare of inmates held in local confinement facilities. If an inspection reveals noncompliance with
the standards, the inspector “shall submit to the Secretary [of DHHS] a written
description of the conditions that caused noncompliance and a preliminary
determination of whether those conditions jeopardize the safe custody, safety,
health or welfare of the inmates confined in the jail.” 10A NCAC 14J .1302(c) (June 2006). Within thirty days after receiving the
report, the Secretary “shall determine whether conditions in the jail
jeopardize the safe custody, safety, health or welfare of its inmates.” Id. at .1303(a) (June 2006). If the confinement facility is not in
compliance with standards regarding the “fire plan” and “fire equipment,” among
other things, the Secretary’s determination is not discretionary. Id. at .1303(c)(2), (3) (June
2006). Specifically, “the Secretary
shall determine that [such] noncompliance . . . jeopardizes the safe custody,
safety, health or welfare of inmates confined in the jail.” Id.
Upon making such a determination, the Secretary “shall notify the local
officials responsible for the jail” and “shall order corrective action, order
the jail closed, or enter into an agreement of correction with local
officials.” Id. at .1303(d)
(June 2006). It is well established
that “the word ‘shall’ is generally imperative or mandatory.” State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 361,
259 S.E.2d 752, 757 (1979); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fortin,
350 N.C. 264, 269, 513 S.E.2d 782, 784-85 (1999); Pearson v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 325 N.C. 246, 255, 382 S.E.2d 745, 749 (1989). Thus, a special relationship exists between
DHHS and the inmates because DHHS has a statutory duty to inspect jails to
ensure their compliance with minimum standards for fire safety. The duty arises out of concern for the
health and welfare of particular individuals--here, the inmates.[Note 2]
The special
relationship exception also applies to the facts of the instant case because of
the relationship between the State and inmates by reason of the inmates’
inability to care for themselves. This
special relationship has been recognized by both this Court and the United
States Supreme Court. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“‘[I]t is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of
his liberty, care for himself.’” (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C.
487, 490, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926))); Medley v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 330
N.C. 837, 842, 412 S.E.2d 654, 657-58 (1992) (same). Inmates in custody necessarily have limited freedom to provide
for themselves or to protect themselves from external dangers such as fire. They cannot ensure that the facility in
which they are confined contains functional safety devices and procedures to
deal with an emergency. Defendant
argues that these cases are inapposite because in each of them, the inmates
were in the custody of the State rather than the county. While defendant is perhaps correct that
Mitchell County was primarily responsible for the health and safety of the
inmates, the General Assembly has determined that the State must also play a
role in establishing and enforcing statewide minimum standards to ensure the
safety of all inmates.
Because
plaintiffs have properly alleged facts that establish the existence of a
special relationship between DHHS and the inmates, we hold that the special
relationship exception to the public duty doctrine applies in the instant
case. Therefore, plaintiffs are not
barred from bringing their negligence claims against DHHS. For the foregoing reasons, the Court of
Appeals decision affirming the Industrial Commission’s order denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss is modified and affirmed.
MODIFIED AND
AFFIRMED.
Chief
Justice PARKER dissenting.
1. In
the same motion, defendant also sought to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims “on the
basis of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the defendant pursuant to N.C. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2).”
Defendant’s claim of sovereign immunity rests on the applicability of
the public duty doctrine to the instant case.
2. We
are not alone in holding that the special relationship exception to the public
duty doctrine may apply in cases involving statutorily-imposed duties that
benefit a particular class of individuals.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa
1979) (“Duty can be created by statute if the legislature purposed or intended
to protect a class of persons to which the victim belongs against a particular
harm which the victim has suffered.” (citations omitted)); Cracraft v. City
of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979) (“A duty of care arises
only when there are additional indicia that the municipality has undertaken the
responsibility of not only protecting itself, but also undertaken the
responsibility of protecting a particular class of persons from the risks
associated with fire code violations.”); McCorkell v. City of Northfield,
266 Minn. 267, 270-71, 123 N.W.2d 367, 370-71 (1963) (finding that statutes
requiring that certain activities be undertaken for the protection of inmates’
health and safety established a duty sufficient to support plaintiff’s cause of
action against the city for negligence after the prisoner died from
asphyxiation caused by a smoldering fire in an unattended jail); Halvorson
v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1978) (“Liability can
be founded upon a municipal code if that code by its terms evidences a clear
intent to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of
persons.” (citations omitted)).
IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 183A06
FILED: 28 JUNE
2007
MULTIPLE
CLAIMANTS
v.
NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF FACILITY
SERVICES, JAILS AND DETENTION SERVICES
Chief
Justice PARKER dissenting.
In
my view, based on Stone v. North Carolina Department of Labor, 347 N.C.
473, 495 S.E.2d 711, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1016, 142 L. Ed. 2d 449
(1998), and Hunt v. North Carolina Department of Labor, 348 N.C. 192,
499 S.E.2d 747 (1998), plaintiffs’ action is barred by the public duty
doctrine.
In
Stone, this Court noted that under the Tort Claims Act, “the State is
liable only under circumstances in which a private person would
be.” 347 N.C. at 478, 495 S.E.2d at 714
(citing N.C.G.S. §143-291). The Court
then stated:
Private persons
do not possess public duties. Only
governmental entities possess authority to enact and enforce laws for the
protection of the public. If the State
were held liable for performing or failing to perform an obligation to the
public at large, the State would have liability when a private person could not. The public duty doctrine, by barring
negligence actions against a governmental entity absent a “special
relationship” or a “special duty” to a particular individual, serves the
legislature’s express intention to permit liability against the State only when
a private person could be liable.
Id. at 478-79,
495 S.E.2d at 714 (citations omitted).
The operation of a local confinement center is a public duty undertaken
by government. See N.C.G.S.
§§153A-216, -218 (2005).
Moreover,
this action is not within the purview of either of the two exceptions to the
public duty doctrine recognized by this Court in Braswell v. Braswell in
that neither a “special relationship” nor a “special duty” exists between the
governmental entity and the injured party.
330 N.C. 363, 371, 410 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1991).
Chapter
153A of the General Statutes, entitled “Counties,” sets forth a county’s
functions and duties. The primary
responsibility for local confinement centers rests with the county. N.C.G.S. §153A-218. Section 153A-218 provides that the county
may “establish, acquire, erect, repair, maintain, and operate local confinement
facilities.” Id. While the General Assembly contemplated a
special relationship between Mitchell County and its own inmates, no language
in Chapter 153A suggests that the State
had a special relationship with Mitchell County’s inmates.
As
noted by the majority, the legislative policy described in section 153A-216(1)
provides that local confinement facilities should be operated to protect the
community as well as the health and welfare of prisoners. N.C.G.S. §153A-216(1). However, an analysis of the plain language
of other subsections of section 153A-216 reveals that the General Assembly
intended that the State should provide minimum statewide standards “to guide
and assist local governments” in establishing confinement facilities and in
developing programs for humane treatment of prisoners and their rehabilitation,
id. §153A-216(2), and “should provide” limited services to local
officials for the maintenance and operation of the county’s confinement
facilities through “inspection, consultation, technical assistance, and other
appropriate services,” id. §153A-216(3).
The
majority relies on three other statutes in Chapter 153A to hold that the
special relationship exception applies in this case. Specifically, the majority focuses on sections 153A-220,
153A-221, and 153A-222. Section
153A-220 not only fails to identify inmates as a special class of individuals
but makes no reference to inmates whatsoever.
The language of N.C.G.S. §153A-220, namely, to “[c]onsult with,”
“provide technical assistance,” “[v]isit and inspect,” “advise,” “recommend,”
and “[r]eview,” manifests the General Assembly’s intent that the State merely
advise and assist a county in the county’s duty to ensure the security of the
confinement center and the safe custody and care of its inmates. Id. §153A-220 (2005).
Similarly,
N.C.G.S. §153A-221 only requires the State to “develop and publish minimum
standards for the operation of local confinement facilities.” Id. §153A-221 (2005). These standards adopted pursuant to section
153A-221 direct the county’s responsibility with regard to the facility and
inmates in its custody. Under N.C.G.S.
§153A-222, the State inspector is to report to local officials who are
responsible for ensuring that the local confinement facility is in conformity
with the standards established pursuant to section 153A-221. Section 153A-222 also references N.C.G.S.
§153A-216(4), which does not address inmate safety but deals with employment
standards and qualifications for personnel at local confinement facilities.
Alleging
that a governmental entity has merely undertaken to perform its duties to
enforce a statute “‘is not sufficient, by itself, to show the creation of a
special relationship with particular individual citizens.’” Hunt, 348 N.C. at 199, 499 S.E.2d at
751 (quoting Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App. 515, 519, 459 S.E.2d 71,
74, disc. rev. denied, 342 N.C. 194, 463 S.E.2d 242 (1995)). Such an
exception is to be “narrowly construed and applied.” Stone, 347 N.C. at 482-83, 495 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Braswell,
330 N.C. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902, and Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at 519,
459 S.E.2d at 74). The statutes under
Chapter 153A pertaining to confinement centers prescribe the State’s limited
advisory and educational role in assisting a local government in its
maintenance and operation of a secure and safe public jail. None of the statutes can reasonably be
construed to establish a “special relationship,” giving rise to an individual
right to recovery, between the State and Mitchell County’s inmates. By enacting these statutes utilizing the
resources of state government to assist local governments in this manner, the
legislature did not intend to make the State “a virtual guarantor” of the
safety of every confinement facility subject to its inspection, thereby,
“‘exposing it to an overwhelming burden of liability’” for the alleged failure
to prevent the county’s alleged negligence in the care, custody and maintenance
of its confinement facility. Hunt, 348
N.C. at 199, 499 S.E.2d at 751 (quoting Sinning, 119 N.C. App. at
519-20, 459 S.E.2d at 74).
While
statutory language is a useful guide to determine the existence of a “special
relationship,” the “special duty” exception exists only when the claimant shows
that an actual promise was made by a State agent. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 371, 410 S.E.2d at 902. Plaintiffs have not alleged such a special
duty.
For
the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Justice
BRADY joins in this dissenting opinion.