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NO. COA04-1242
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:
6 September 2005
LEE ANN WHITINGS,
Plaintiff,
v. Bladen County
No.
03 CVS 00924
WOLFSON CASING CORP.,
Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 30 June 2004 by Judge
William C. Gore, Jr. in Bladen County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 2005.
Faith
Herndon for plaintiff-appellant.
Ferris
& McCall, PC, by Craig T. McCall, and Frank & Associates, PC, by Saul
D. Zabell, for defendant-appellee.
ELMORE, Judge.
Lee Ann Whitings (plaintiff) appeals an order of the trial
court dismissing her complaint. Because
this Court’s review of an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
requires that we accept the facts alleged in the pleadings as true, we recite
the facts stated in plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff was hired by Wolfson Casing Corporation (defendant) as a shift
supervisor in August of 2001. Plaintiff
was responsible for supervising employees who were pullers and machine
operators. In March of 2002 David
McDowell (McDowell), the manager of plaintiff’s facility, told plaintiff that
she needed to demonstrate her ability to operate the machines being used by her
shift employees. McDowell assigned
plaintiff to operate a finishing machine, rather than perform her routine
duties of supervising shift employees.
On or about 13 March 2002, plaintiff experienced pain and swelling in
her hands while operating the machine.
On 16 March 2002 plaintiff told McDowell that her hands were hurting and
asked that defendant pay for her to see the company doctor. McDowell directed her to get back on the
machine, but plaintiff refused to do so.
Thereafter, McDowell suspended plaintiff for three working days without
pay because she refused to continue operating the finishing machine.
On 18 March 2002 an employee of defendant authorized
plaintiff to see a doctor for her hand and arm problems. Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Laura
Matthews-Thompson, and defendant paid for this doctor’s visit. Dr. Matthews-Thompson diagnosed plaintiff
with work-related tendinitis and wrote a note stating that plaintiff could not
work on the finishing machine. On 21
March 2002, when plaintiff was scheduled to return to work following her
suspension, McDowell called plaintiff at home and told her to resume operating
the finishing machine. When plaintiff
declined to continue operating the machine, McDowell informed plaintiff that
she was terminated.
On 18 April 2002 plaintiff filed an employment
discrimination charge with the North Carolina Department of Labor (NCDOL). The NCDOL issued plaintiff a right-to-sue
letter on 6 March 2003. On 10 December
2003 plaintiff filed a complaint in Bladen County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleged two causes of action: (1)
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §95-240 et seq., the North Carolina
Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA); and (2) wrongful discharge in
violation of North Carolina public policy protecting employees against
retaliatory discharge for asserting their legal rights under Chapter 97 of the
General Statutes, the Workers’ Compensation Act. Defendant attempted to remove the action to federal court, but
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ultimately
determined that removal was improper and remanded the action to Bladen County
Superior Court.
On 24 May 2004 defendant filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. Defendant asserted
that plaintiff’s statutory claim under REDA was time-barred because plaintiff
failed to file her complaint within 90 days of the date that the right-to-sue
letter was issued. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. §95-243 (2003) (“A civil action under this section shall be commenced by
an employee within 90 days of the date upon which the right-to-sue letter was
issued . . . .”). Judge William C.
Gore, Jr. conducted a hearing on the motion on 1 June 2004. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing
the materials submitted by the parties, the trial court found that plaintiff’s
claim under REDA was time-barred. The
court also found that plaintiff failed to plead the elements of the common law
claim of wrongful discharge in violation of North Carolina public policy. Accordingly, the court ordered that
plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed in its entirety. From this order entered 30 June 2004, plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff does not challenge the court’s dismissal of her
claim under REDA. Plaintiff’s sole
argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court found that plaintiff’s complaint alleging
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted for two reasons: (1) plaintiff refused to return to
work when requested by defendant; and (2) plaintiff’s employment was not
terminated by defendant for filing a workers’ compensation claim. We now consider whether either of these
grounds will uphold the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim.
In North Carolina, the employer-employee relationship is
governed by the at-will employment doctrine, which states that “in the absence
of a contractual agreement between an employer and an employee establishing a
definite term of employment, the relationship is presumed to be terminable at
the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance of either
party.” Kurtzman v. Applied
Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997),
reh’g denied, 347 N.C. 586, 502 S.E.2d 594 (1998). However, our Supreme Court has recognized a
cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy of
North Carolina. See Coman v. Thomas
Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989).
There is no
specific list of what actions constitute a violation of public policy. . .
. However, wrongful discharge claims
have been recognized in North Carolina where the employee was discharged (1)
for refusing to violate the law at the employer’s request, . . . (2) for
engaging in a legally protected activity, or (3) based on some activity by the
employer contrary to law or public policy[.]
Ridenhour
v. IBM Corp.,
132 N.C. App. 563, 568-69, 512 S.E.2d 774, 778 (internal citations omitted), disc.
review denied, 350 N.C. 595, 537 S.E.2d 481 (1999).
This Court has stated that “[p]ursuing one’s rights under
the Workers’ Compensation Act, G.S. §§97-1 et seq. (2003), is a legally
protected activity. . . . Therefore, a
plaintiff may state a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy where he or she alleges the dismissal resulted from an assertion of rights
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Brackett
v. SGL Carbon Corp., 158 N.C. App. 252, 259-60, 580 S.E.2d 757, 762
(2003). The plaintiff has the burden of
pleading that the dismissal was causally related to the protected
activity. See Salter v. E & J
Healthcare, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 685, 693, 575 S.E.2d 46, 51 (2003).
Plaintiff argues that she has met her burden of alleging
that her termination was causally related to a protected activity. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that
“Defendant refused to pay Plaintiff any disability benefits arising from her
lost time from work when she could no longer operate the finishing machine,
including any disability benefits that might have been due Plaintiff under the
North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-1 et seq.” Plaintiff further alleged that “Defendant’s
conduct in discharging Plaintiff constitutes a wrongful discharge in violation
of North Carolina public policy protecting individuals against retaliatory
discharge for asserting their legal rights under Chapter 97 of the General
Statutes of North Carolina[.]”
Essentially, plaintiff contends that she engaged in a protected activity
when she requested that her employer pay for a medical evaluation of a
work-related injury. We cannot agree.
The public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine is confined to the express statements contained within our General
Statutes or our Constitution. See
Considine v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 145 N.C. App. 314, 320-21, 551 S.E.2d
179, 184, aff’d per curiam, 354 N.C. 568, 557 S.E.2d 528 (2001). Both the Workers’ Compensation Act and the
Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (REDA) are sources of policy
establishing an employee’s legally protected right of pursuing a workers’
compensation claim. An action pursuant
to REDA is a supplemental remedy to the common law claim of wrongful
discharge. See Salter, 155 N.C.
App. at 695-96, 575 S.E.2d at 53. This
Court has repeatedly stated that REDA prohibits discrimination against an
employee who has filed a workers’ compensation claim. See, e.g., Wiley v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 164 N.C. App. 183, 186, 594 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2004); Tarrant v.
Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc., 163 N.C. App. 504, 510, 593 S.E.2d 808,
812, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 739, 603 S.E.2d 126 (2004); Salter,
155 N.C. App. at 690, at 575 S.E.2d at 50; Johnson v. Trustees of Durham
Tech. Cmty. Coll., 139 N.C. App. 676, 681, 535 S.E.2d 357, 361 (2000), disc.
review improvidently allowed, 357 N.C. 570, 597 S.E.2d 670 (2003). In enacting REDA and its predecessor
statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-6.1, the General Assembly intended to prevent
employer retaliation from having a chilling effect upon an employee’s exercise
of his or her statutory rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Conklin v. Carolina Narrow
Fabrics Co., 113 N.C. App. 542, 543-44, 439 S.E.2d 239, 240 (1994). Thus, the exercise of one’s rights under the
Act is the legally protected activity.
Asking an employer to pay for a doctor’s visit or other medical services
is merely an abstract assertion and not an assertion of rights under the
Act. Rather, it is the filing of a
workers’ compensation claim that triggers the statutory and common law
protection against employer retaliation in violation of public policy.
Plaintiff has not alleged that she filed a claim seeking
workers’ compensation benefits in connection with her injury. We conclude that by failing to allege the
filing of a workers’ compensation claim at any time either prior or
subsequent to her discharge, plaintiff has failed to plead that she engaged in
a legally protected activity. Cf.
Tarrant, 163 N.C. App. at 509, 593 S.E.2d at 812 (reversing trial court’s
dismissal of common law wrongful discharge claim where “[p]laintiff’s
allegations of the events regarding her hiring and firing tend to show that she
was fired because she filed a workers’ compensation claim”). As plaintiff has not alleged that she was
fired for engaging in a legally protected activity, she has failed to plead all
elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. We, therefore, affirm the order of the trial
court below.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and CALABRIA concur.