NORTH CAROLINA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

I.C. NO. 640303

TERESA Y. WILLIFORD,                                             )
                                                                       Employee,)
                                                                           Plaintiff;)
                                                                                       )                      AMENDED
     -v-                                                                             )           OPINION AND AWARD
                                                                                       )
BELLSOUTH                                                                 )                             B Y
TELECOMMUNICATIONS,                                        )
                                                                        Employer;)            MORGAN S. CHAPMAN
                                                                                       )         DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
SELF-INSURED,                                                           )
                                                                       Defendant.)

                                                                            FILED:

        This case was heard before the undersigned in Raleigh on May 6, 1997. The parties were allowed additional time in which to depose Dr. Coxe, Dr. Taylor, Dr. Grigg and Dr. Herfkens. Those depositions were subsequently submitted for review. There were also exhibits attached to the deposition, but those exhibits were neither offered nor stipulated into evidence. Consequently, they have not been received into evidence and have not been considered.

        All objections by the parties have been ruled upon in accordance with the law and the decision in this case.

A P P E A R A N C E S

        Plaintiff:         Sally M. Keith, Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina; appearing.

        Defendant:     Leon H. Lee, Jr., Attorney, appearing.

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        The undersigned finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as

        1. At the time of the alleged contraction of an occupational disease, the parties were subject to and bound by the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.

        2. The employer-employee relationship existed between defendant-employer and plaintiff.

        3. Bell South Telecommunications was a self-insured employer.

        In addition, the parties stipulated into evidence the following:

        1. Form 22 dated July 10, 1996.

        2. Psychological reports from Dr. Cobb and Dr. Sandling.

        3. Records and reports from American Day Treatment Center.

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        Based upon all of the competent evidence in the record, the undersigned makes the following

        1. Plaintiff is forty years old and a high school graduate. As of January 1996, she had worked as a service representative (service rep) for defendant for ten to eleven years and her average weekly wage was $665.48. Her job involved taking incoming calls from customers, adding telephone services, changing services and handling billing inquires and adjustments. Service reps were required to question the customer to determine what services he wanted or needed and sell as many services as possible. Plaintiff initially enjoyed the position and was one of the top sales people, but the company subsequently added disclosure information which had to be given to the customers while it placed expected time limits on calls and essentially gave the service reps conflicting expectations. The calls were timed and the employees were reprimanded if their calls were too long, but they were expected to establish rapport with the customer, "discover" as much as possible regarding the customer’s needs and then explain the extensive disclosure information for any services purchased. The supervisors, therefore, placed pressure on them to get off of a call as quickly as possible on the one hand but to sell as many services as possible on the other.

        2. The service reps were also monitored periodically by supervisors in the Charlotte office. A green light would turn on their computers at that time to inform them that someone was listening to the conversation. There was no advance warning when this would occur. If something was left out of the presentation or if something was said which was not supposed to be said, the employee could be reprimanded or fired. The local supervisor also would sit in with the service reps approximately twice each month. In both situations, it was a stressful occurrence for the employee.

        3. The computers on which the service reps worked monitored not only the length of their calls but also the time they were logged in, so that break periods were checked closely. Since the break times were scheduled in advance, there could be problems taking a break if a call ran over into that time slot.

        4. For unknown reasons, defendant also began to ask service reps to work a great deal of overtime. Under the terms of the union contract, the company could expect them to work up to thirteen consecutive days with only a couple of days off before returning to work. They were also expected to work up to twelve hours of overtime in a given week.

        5. In January 1985 plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetes. She had to check her blood sugar periodically during the day, eat at regular intervals and take insulin shots before meals in order to keep her blood sugar under control so that she would not develop adverse effects from the disease. If she had an unsympathetic supervisor, it was difficult for her to follow the instructions she had been given by Dr. Coxe, her endocrinologist. Consequently, it was harder to keep her blood sugar levels under control. The problem was complicated during her last year of employment when she was placed on relief shift. She would not know what her schedule would be much in advance, so planning for meals and insulin shots was even more difficult.

        6. The work environment for the service reps was very stressful due to the almost unattainable expectations of the company, the excessive hours, the unpredictable schedules and the harsh monitoring procedures. It was not uncommon to see one of the service reps leaving the room in tears. The situation was especially difficult for plaintiff with her medical condition when she worked for a supervisor named Betty, who was unsympathetic and unsupportive. There were times when plaintiff had to work as many as twelve days in a row. She was married and had two children, one of whom was a teenager, so she had other responsibilities which she could not attend to during those extended periods at work and, when she finally got time off, she was too tired to deal effectively with problems at home.

        7. Plaintiff was the type of person who wanted to do well at her job. When she worked hard to satisfy her employer but could not seem to achieve what was demanded, she began to doubt herself, feel increasingly hopeless and lose self esteem. The company’s lack of concern for her medical needs and for her personal responsibilities in life made matters worse. She began to dread to go to work but, since her family was very dependent upon her income, she felt trapped since she was not aware of many jobs which would pay similar wages to an employee with only a high school education.

        8. At some point, Dr. Coxe became concerned about how plaintiff’s work was affecting her health and he sent a note to her employer restricting the number of consecutive days she could work. He also noted that she was to get up and walk after working for an hour because she had fibromyalgia. After that time, she no longer had to work twelve consecutive days and she would usually get up and walk five to ten minutes every two hours at work.

        9. However, plaintiff became increasingly depressed. She was also feeling exhausted and found herself incapable of dealing with family problems. By January 1996 she was seriously contemplating suicide. Dr. Coxe recognized her emotional distress at that time and referred her to Dr. Taylor, a psychologist. Dr. Taylor assessed her condition and determined that she was extremely depressed, distressed and anxious. Both Dr. Taylor and Dr. Coxe recommended that she take a leave of absence from work and they subsequently arranged for her to attend the American Day Treatment Program due to the severity and complex nature of her problem. She was referred to Dr. Grigg, a psychiatrist, who prescribed anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medication for her and who monitored her progress in the out-patient program.

        10. The American Day Treatment Program lasted from February 15 until March 22, 1996. Plaintiff’s condition improved during the program. The evidence was not clear regarding whether she returned to work after that time. Dr. Taylor referred to an unsuccessful attempt to return to work which was disastrous because of defendant’s unwillingness to work with plaintiff regarding her health and psychological problems, but plaintiff’s testimony was not clear on that point. In any event, even the prospect of returning to work for defendant caused her to be anxious and depressed and Dr. Taylor advised her to not return to work for that company.

        11. Plaintiff worked hard at trying to recover and her coping skills improved. She also consulted with Vocational Rehabilitation and began to take accounting courses, looking towards the time when she would be able to return to work. She has done well in the courses she has taken, which is an achievement that would tend to improve her self-esteem and self-confidence.

        12. Dr. Taylor and Dr. Grigg continued to follow plaintiff’s recovery until the date of hearing. Plaintiff had not been released to return to work by them as of that date.

        13. Defendant sent plaintiff for several independent psychological examinations, some of which were related to her disability insurance claim. The findings were generally consistent with those of Dr. Taylor. However, Dr. Herfkens indicated after her evaluation in March 1997 that plaintiff was capable of some type of work and defendant insisted that plaintiff returned to work at that time. In view of the way defendants had previously treated plaintiff, the fact that her condition was due in substantial part to her former working conditions, and plaintiff’s then present condition, Dr. Taylor did not concur with the work release and advised the plaintiff to not return to work at that time. Consequently, plaintiff followed the recommendation of her treating psychologist and did not go back to work. She remained out of work as of the date of hearing.

        14. By January 1996 plaintiff developed an adjustment disorder with depressed affect with which subsequently progressed to a major depression. Due to the very stressful working conditions in her position as a service representative, she was placed at an increased risk of developing this condition as compared to the general public not so employed. Her employment was a significant contributing factor in the development of her depressive illness even though there were other causal factors involved which were unrelated to her job. However, her exhaustion from her work situation made her less able to deal with family problems and was therefore also a factor in her response to those problems.

        15. Consequently, plaintiff’s major depression was an occupational disease which was due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her employment with defendant-employer and which was not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public was equally exposed.

        16. As a result of her occupational disease, plaintiff was unable to work beginning on an unknown date in January 1996. She remained unable to work in any capacity through the date of hearing, except that there may have been a period when she unsuccessfully attempted to return to work. As of the date of hearing, she was still within the healing period and had not reached maximum medical improvement, although her condition was significantly improved. In view of the unreasonable demands placed upon her as a service representative, the lack of consideration shown for her health while she was working, and the justified lack of trust in the company which resulted, it is very questionable whether she will ever be able to return to work for defendant, even in a different capacity.

        17. Defendant paid disability benefits to plaintiff for periods during her disability pursuant to a totally employer-funded program.

        18. Plaintiff has also claimed compensation on the basis that the stress of her employment aggravated her diabetes. In fact, stress is thought to have an adverse affect on glucose control and generally tends to elevate blood sugar. However, plaintiff developed diabetes independently of her employment and had periods of time when her blood sugar levels were poorly controlled when stress at work was not a factor. According to Dr. Coxe, any diabetic is going to have periods of instability.

        19. The stressful work environment with defendant was not proven to have placed plaintiff at an increased risk of developing diabetes; nor was it proven to have been a significant contributing factor in the development of that condition.

        20. Plaintiff’s diabetes was not an occupational disease which was due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her employment and which excluded ordinary diseases of life to which the general public was equally exposed.

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        Based upon the foregoing stipulations and findings of fact, the undersigned makes the following

        1. As of January 1996 plaintiff developed major depression which was an occupational disease due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her employment and which was not an ordinary disease of life to which the general public was equally exposed. G.S. §97-53 (13). Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458 (1979).

        2. Plaintiff is entitled to compensation at the rate of $443.68 per week for the temporary total disability she sustained as a result of this occupational disease through May 6, 1997 and continuing thereafter for as long as she remains so disabled. However, defendant is entitled to the credit allowed by statute for disability benefits paid to her during that time. G.S. §97-29; G.S. §97- 42.

        3. Plaintiff is entitled to have defendants provide all medical compensation arising from this occupational disease. G.S. §97-2(19); G.S. §97-59.

        4. Plaintiff's diabetes was not an occupational disease which was due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her employment with defendant-employer and which excluded all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public was equally exposed. G.S. §97-53 (13); Booker v. Duke Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458 (1979); Wilkins v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 333 N.C. 449 (1993).

        5. Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act for her diabetes. G.S. §97-2 et seq.

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        Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the undersigned enters the following

        1. Defendant shall pay compensation to plaintiff for temporary total disability at the rate of $443.68 per week beginning in January 1996 when she stopped working and continuing for the periods she was out of work through the date of hearing on May 6, 1997. Defendants shall continue to pay compensation to her thereafter for as long as she remains so disabled. However, this Award is subject to the credit allowed by statute for disability benefits paid to her during that time. This Award is also subject to the attorney’s fee hereinafter approved.

        2. Defendant shall pay all medical expenses incurred by plaintiff as a result of her occupational disease.

        3. However, plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits for her diabetes is hereby DENIED.

        4. An attorney’s fee in the amount of twenty-five percent of the net compensation awarded is approved for plaintiff’s counsel. She shall receive a lump sum from the accrued compensation and thereafter every fourth check.

        5. Defendants shall pay an additional expert witness fee in the amount of $275.00 to Dr. Coxe based upon the fact that his billing statement reflected an incorrect time for the deposition and an incorrect preparation time.

        6. Defendants shall pay the costs.

        IT IS FURTHERMORE ORDERED that this case be REMOVED from the Raleigh hearing docket.

                                     S/                                   
MORGAN S. CHAPMAN
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER

MSC:ib

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